Section 1: Introduction | |
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WHAT IS INFORMATION WARFARE? "We live in an age that is driven by information. It's an age which Alvin Toffler has called the Third Wave. The ability to acquire and communicate huge volumes of information in real time, the computing power to analyze this information quickly, and the control systems to pass this analysis to multiple users simultaneously -- these are the technological breakthroughs that are changing the face of war and how we prepare for war." The last few hundred years have witnessed numerous revolutions in military affairs. More often than not, these revolutions are initiated by a new technology. Someone then finds an innovative way to apply this technology on the battlefield. When the technology and its application are proven successful, then military organization is changed to accommodate them. For example, in the early decades of this century, air power developed from a curiosity to a major new war form. Similarly, the development of nuclear propulsion after World War II resulted in entirely new forms of submarine warfare. We are at the dawn of yet another revolution. The ongoing technology explosion, particularly in data processing and communications, has prompted visions of an "information age", a concept that is challenging the underlying precepts of how we view combat. During the "industrial age", warfare was mechanized and organized along industrial principles, and the side that could produce the most bullets would win. The rise of the information age, however, means that we have to review our theories of combat in terms of a new concept: information warfare. This idea has been discussed with increasing frequency over the past decade, but the events of the Gulf War propelled it onto the front burner of military thinking. Much effort has been dedicated to studying the nature, means, and ends of information warfare. To some, it's simply a repackaging of things the military has been doing since at least Roman times. To others, information warfare is nothing less than a revolutionary new idea. In reality, both views are correct, and neither, by itself, is complete. This article will provide a brief discussion of the major issues in information warfare. What is information warfare? There is no universally agreed-upon definition. An underlying foundation of most definitions is that information warfare is conflict in which information is the resource, the target, and the weapon, all at the same time. Information has a number of characteristics that differentiate it from other types of resources. The primary one is that information has a virtual, not a physical, existence. You can't touch it like a bullet or a bomb, nor can you really quantify or qualify it. It is an infinite resource: it can exist in many places at the same time, and the same information can be used by both sides in a conflict. Information is also non-linear: while volumes of data may have no effect, one tiny can change the course of history, and a significant advantage that took years to develop can evaporate in an instant. Although a lot of attention has been focused recently on high-tech developments, information itself is a separate entity from technological applications. Since information has a virtual existence, it follows that some information warfare can take place in the virtual arena. Information systems, however, have a physical existence, so at least some information warfare will take place in the physical realm. This gives protagonists the option of using virtual or physical, lethal or non-lethal, strategies. As we will see, information warfare is not limited to the military. Nearly everybody - military and civilian - has engaged in some form of it at some point. To help put this nebulous concept in more concrete terms, we can start with the current Joint Chiefs of Staff definition of information warfare (IW): "Actions taken to achieve information superiority in support of national military strategy by affecting adversary information and information systems while leveraging and protecting our information and information systems." Although this sounds at first like a perfect example of Washington-speak, it contains a number of subtle, but key, points: Command and Control Warfare (C2W) is a term that is often used instead of, or interchangeably with, IW. They are different, however. The JCS defines C2W as: "The integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological ops (PSYOPS), electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy an adversary's C2 capabilities, while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions." C2W is clearly oriented towards military action. It encompasses five military-specific operational areas, all equally supported by a sixth, oriented against military-specific targets. The goals, methods, and resources in this definition are not nearly as broad as those for information warfare. All of these C2W functions, however, are included in IW. C2W is, therefore, the military subset of information warfare. This is a critical distinction. "Information warfare" applies to all aspects of competition, from economic/political to all-out warfare. C2W applies specifically to military operations. While the military typically focuses on C2W, we must not ignore the bigger picture. Like it or not, our enemies will use non-military information warfare against us. We must be prepared to defend against those attacks and to coordinate friendly C2W actions with other friendly information warfare activities. Much of what we have discussed so far may appear to be old news. Most of these things have been discussed ad nauseum in various contexts for years. There are two aspects which are new. One is technical: the exploding automation and interconnectivity of systems. The other is conceptual: the idea of information itself being a weapon, resource, and target. It is these two aspects which are changing our views on information and warfare. Within both IW and C2W there are a number of different specific activities. Data must first be collected. It must be processed into some useable form of information. This information must be communicated to the appropriate entities. Offensive IW or C2W acts may or may not be attempted. Simultaneously with all the above actions, our own information and information systems must be protected from any outside interference. |
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