Section 8: Military Impacts | |
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Within the military, the advent of information warfare raises some new and disturbing questions. What, for example, is an "informational act of war"? How do we know we've been attacked in such a manner that a military response is necessary? What is information battle damage and how do you assess it? Who is the CINC for cyberspace? These and other issues are being hotly debated in the IW/C2W community and there is no consensus on answers to any of them yet. At this stage, our national posture on information warfare is like a big jigsaw puzzle. There are thousands of small, inter-related pieces, many of which have already been put together, but we do not have the overall picture (a national information warfare policy) to guide our efforts. As a result, the services are charging forward with their own best guesses as to how it should be done. There seems to be general agreement that the three issues which are currently most important are doctrine, organization, and training. Since military doctrine flows from national policy, we probably won't have a firm doctrine for some time. However, we can (and have) made our first stabs at it, creating rough mockups from which to work. Each service and the JCS have drafted their own specific IW/C2W guidelines. As a practical matter, the military is generally adopting an evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, approach. Existing programs are being consolidated and incrementally expanded. Most of the focus is on C2W actions, both in improving our own collection and use of information, as well as influencing or degrading an opponent's information. We will need to expand our workings with other governmental agencies in the near term. As our understanding of IW and C2W improve, the doctrines will be revised. Organization is the next major issue. An effective organization is probably more important than technology in creating and implementing sound IW/C2W actions. In the information age, the dominant organizational model is the network. This is already having a significant impact on both military and civilian organizations. As one author noted, "Institutions can be defeated by networks, and it may take networks to counter networks. The future may belong to whoever masters the network form." Traditional military hierarchies and the new network forms have very different strengths and vulnerabilities. Reports of the death of hierarchies are probably premature, but the military must address how to respond and adapt to this new organizational challenge. The third major issue for the military is training. Most of the current generation of info warriors are self-taught, and there have been numerous masters' theses written in military and civilian universities around the country. New courses are coming on-line now, such as at the National Defense University, but there must be training for all ranks from senior officer to junior enlisted technicians. Some exercises, such as Kernel Blitz 95, are testing IW/C2W techniques and theories and this trend should continue. The services have all created their own organizations that are charged with planning and developing IW/C2W doctrine, capabilities, and training. Within the Navy, the Naval Security Group was named the executive agent for IW, and two subordinate organizations were established. One, the Navy Information Warfare Activity (NIWA), was created in August 1994. NIWA acts as the Navy's principal agent with national-level agencies for development of special IW/C2W techniques to support both fleet and national operations. The Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC) was created a little later. It consolidated the C2W groups under one command and is tasked with planning, training, and conducting all aspects of IW/C2W operations in the fleet. The Army and Air Force established one command each. The Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) is a small group under the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). The Air Force created the Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC) with over 1,000 personnel in San Antonio in September 1993. Both activities are charged with planning IW/C2W doctrine, training, and operations, as well as playing varying roles in technology and system acquisition. |
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